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THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT: AN
OBSTACLE TO ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES?*
Sheila Lynch
Abstract: Ecosystem management, the new guiding concept for federal land management,
requires collaboration and information sharing across ownership boundaries, facilitation of
changes in social values, and adaptation to new scientific and social information. Particularly
in the western states, the federal land management agencies have been involved to varying
degrees in innovative collaborative processes with the goal of implementing ecosystem
management. However, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which places
numerous procedural requirements on certain federal interactions with non-federal parties, has
been cited as an obstacle to federal participation in these efforts. This Comment presents an
analytic framework for determining when FACA applies and recommends strategies for
overcoming this perceived obstacle to ecosystem management.

In 1972, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)' was enacted
to combat the secrecy, wastefulness, and unbalanced representation
typical of many committees advising the federal government on national
policies.' FACA requires groups it defines as advisory committees to
follow certain procedures. In the summer of 1994, the fear of potential
FACA violations caused the U. S. Forest Service (USFS) and Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) to curtail their involvement in a Southern
Oregon initiative heralded as one of the leading efforts to improve and
coordinate land management with increased public participation.3 The
federal land management agencies repeatedly have cited FACA as a
stumbling block in their efforts to implement ecosystem management.4
* The research for this paper was funded in part by the Legal Issues in Ecosystem Management
project, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research
Station, People and Natural Resources Program.
1. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. (1994)). 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 1534(b), enacted in 1995, exempts meetings between state, local, tribal, and federal government
employees from FACA, where "such meetings are solely for the purposes of exchanging views,
information, or advice relating to the management or implementation of Federal programs
established pursuant to public law that explicitly or inherently share intergovernmental
responsibilities or administration."
2. For a general discussion of FACA's enactment, see Richard 0. Levine, The FederalAdvisory
CommitteeAct, 10 Harv. J. on Legis. 217, 225 (1973).
3. Kathie Durbin, ForestAdvisory Groups Cut Off, Oregonian (Portland), June 25, 1994, at D4.
4. Derek Vanderwood & Alex Antypas, Ecosystem Management Case Study: The Central
Cascades Adaptive Management Area 8 (May 1, 1995) (unpublished draft, on file with the
Washington Law Review, prepared for the Legal Issues in Ecosystem Management Project, U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture); Sheila Lynch, Ecosystem Management Case Study: The Applegate Adaptive
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This Comment addresses whether FACA applies to various federal
ecosystem management efforts and suggests potential remedies for its
resulting chilling effect. First, the Comment describes the concept of
ecosystem management and some of the collaborative groups organized
to implement it. Second, it reviews FACA case law and discusses
whether courts are likely to find that various collaborative efforts fit
within the scope of the statute. Third, the Comment discusses some of
the problems likely to arise if ecosystem management groups are
required to comply with FACA. Finally, it suggests ways in which the
statute or agency regulations and guidelines might be changed to further
the goals of FACA in the ecosystem management context, while
reducing the uncertainty and other obstacles presented by FACA, its
implementing regulations, and relevant case law.
I.

ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT AS THE NEW PARADIGM
FOR LAND MANAGEMENT

A.

DefiningEcosystem Management

Despite the growing acceptance of the ecosystem approach to land
management, the term "ecosystem management" has been defined
differently according to discipline and perspective. 5 Many commentators
agree that in addition to the scientific basis, there are social and
economic elements to the concept.6 While disagreement exists regarding
the relative importance of these components,7 there appears to be a
consensus that ecological considerations are the foundation.8

Management Area and the Applegate Partnership 16-17 (August 28, 1995) (unpublished draft, on
file with the Washington Law Review, prepared for the Legal Issues in Ecosystem Management
Project, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture); Resources, Community, and Economic Dev,.lopment Division,
U.S. General Accounting Office, Ecosystem Management:AdditionalActions Needed To Adequately
Test a Promising Approach 73 (comments of Bureau of Land Management) (August 1994)
[hereinafter GAO Report].
5. R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 Conservation Biology 27, 28
(1994).
6. Id. at 29-31. See also Margaret A. Moote et al., University of Arizona, Principlesof Ecosystem
Management 1 (1994); Keystone Center, National Ecosystem Management Forum Meeting
Summary 6 (Nov. 16-17, 1993).
7. See Grumbine, supranote 5, at 28; Keystone Center, supranote 6, at 6.
8. Grumbine, supra note 5, at 32; GAO Report, supra note 4, at 6 ("The practicll starting point for
ecosystem management will have to be to maintain or restore the minimum level cf ecosystem health
necessary to meet existing legal requirements.").

Ecosystem Management and FACA
At the core is the idea that land and wildlife managers should manage
ecosystems, not just individual species.9 An ecosystem is defined as "[a]
community of organisms, interacting with one another, plus the
environment in which they live and with which they also interact.''
Ecosystems may be identified at a variety of scales, from small plots of
land to entire continents." Most conservation biologists advocate a land
management focus on large-scale ecosystems, and ecosystem
2
management efforts to date have been conducted on a large scale.'
The federal land system contains only some parts of large-scale
ecosystems, the result of ownership and management designations based
on politics rather than biology. 3 As a result, ecosystem management
proponents advise extending ecosystem protection across ownership and
jurisdictional boundaries.' 4 Financial and political considerations make it
highly unlikely that the federal government will acquire the land needed
to protect large-scale ecosystems. 5 Therefore, most agree that ecosystem
management requires some form of coordinated management of public
and private lands within ecosystems. Land management along ecosystem
boundaries, rather than ownership and jurisdictional boundaries, requires
new institutions and forms of communication to coordinate management
practices, facilitate an exchange of ecological and social information
among landowners, and accommodate and account for changes in social
values. 16
9. See R. Edward Grumbine, Protecting Biological Diversity Through the Greater Ecosystem
Concept, 10(3) Nat. Areas J. 114 (1990).
10. M. Abercrombie et al., The PenguinDictionaryofBiology 97 (7th ed. 1980).
11. GAO Report, supra note 4, at 21-22.
12. According to the principles of conservation biology, preservation of overall biodiversity
requires protection of habitats in large geographical areas. Michael Soule, What Is Conservation
Biology?, 35 Bioscience 727 (1985), reprinted in Biodiversity and Environmental Policy 40-42
(R.E. Grumbine ed., 1994). Some examples of the scale at which ecosystem management is being
discussed include the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and the Pacific Northwest forests. See Jerry F.
Franklin, The Fundamentalsof Ecosystem Management with Applications in the Pacific Northwest,
in Defining Sustainable Forestry132 (Gregory H. Aplet et al. eds., 1993).
13. See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem
Management, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293,295 (1994).
14. GAO Report, supranote 4, at 57.
15. National Research Council, Setting Prioritiesfor Land Conservation 20-24 (1993).
16. Errol E. Meidinger, Organizationaland Legal Challengesfor Ecosystem Management 1-2, in
Creatinga Forestryfor the 21st Century: The Science of Ecosystem Management (Jerry F. Franklin
& Kathryn A. Kohm eds., forthcoming 1996); M.A. Shannon & C. Anderson, InstitutionalStrategies
for Landscape Management, in Washington Forest Landscape Management Project-Progress
Report 146 (Washington Dep't of Natural Resources, Washington Dep't of Fish & Wildlife, and
U.S. Forest Service, Andrew B. Carey & Catherine Elliot eds., 1994) ("As is the case in all aspects
related to what can be broadly termed ecosystem management, the capacity for cross-jurisdictional
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Ecosystem management, according to most analysts, also includes an
economic component. One leading commentator contends that one such
component is "Humans Embedded in Nature."' 7 This human factor has
prompted many proponents of ecosystem management .o call for the
development of sustainable economies within ecological constraints. 8
Collaboration among those with an interest in an ecosystem is an
important element of ecosystem management.19 Collaborative groups can
increase information exchange between landowners and managers,
facilitate management across jurisdictional boundaries, and support
management practices likely to reduce or change the economic uses of
natural resources. Federal sources, including the recent General
Accounting Office report on ecosystem management, recognize a need
for building collaborative frameworks among federal agencies, other
government entities, and private landowners.20
B.

Adoption of the Concept of Ecosystem Management by Federal
Agencies

In the 1990s, federal policy has begun to shift toward ecosystem
management of federal lands. Since 1992, all four of the federal land
management agencies (USFS, BLM, National Park Sen,ice, and U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service) have announced their intent to adopt an
ecosystem approach to management of the lands in their jurisdictions.2 '
In directing the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to issue a
record of decision on management of Pacific Northwest forests,
coordination is the major potential barrier in developing a landscape management approach.");
Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept ofEcosystem Management on the Public Lands,
25 Land & Water L. Rev. 43,45 (1990).
17. Grumbine, supranote 5, at 31.
18. Participants in the 1993 Keystone Center National Ecosystem Managemen: Forum defined the
goal of ecosystem management as "preserving, restoring or, where those are not possible, simulating
ecosystem integrity as defined by composition., structure and function that also maintains the
possibility of sustainablesocieties and economies." Keystone Center, supra note 6, at 9 (emphasis
added).
19. See, e.g., Moote et al., supra note 6, at 1; GAO Report, supra note 4, at 70-71 (citing
Department of Interior comments on the report: "Just as interagency collaboration is important,
finding ways to increase voluntary cooperation with state, tribal, and local governments, as well as
nongovernmental organizations and the public, is key to effective ecosystem management." ).
However, there is disagreement as to who should be represented in such effirts; whether local
interests alone should be represented or whether a broader range of interests shou d be included. See,
e.g., Keystone Center, supra note 6, at 5.
20. GAO Report, supra note 4, at 57.
21. Id. at 4.

Ecosystem Management and FACA
President Bill Clinton required adoption of an ecosystem management
approach.22
C.

CollaborativeEcosystem Management Groups

Ecosystem management efforts to date have involved a variety of
collaborative, multi-interest groups with varying levels of federal
participation. Most groups have at least a core of federal officials,
environmental advocates, and representatives of resource extraction
industries, who make decisions by consensus.2 3
Both federal and state agencies show increasing interest in the use of
such groups in resource agency decisionmaking. For instance, the federal
management plan for the Pacific Northwest forests has created Adaptive
Management Areas (AMAs) whose mandate includes innovation in
collaborative efforts across political jurisdictions and ownership
boundaries.24 Similarly, Washington State's Department of Natural
Resources has produced a study on landscape management, which
includes a section on collaborative, consensual decision-making.
The following sections describe models of ecosystem management
groups that are loosely based on characteristics of existing groups. The
analytic categories used correspond to issues raised by FACA case law.26

22. U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't ofAgric. & U.S. Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of
Interior, Record of Decisionfor Amendments to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management
PlanningDocuments Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl 5 (April 13, 1994) [hereinafter
Record ofDecision]. The forest plan recently was upheld in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F.
Supp. 1291 (,V.D. Wash. 1994).
23. See Sheila Lynch, Ecosystem Management Case Study: Cooperative Monitoring, Evaluation
and Research, and Watershed Analysis 4, 7 (1995) (unpublished draft on file with Washington Law
Review, prepared for Legal Issues in Ecosystem Management Project, U.S. Forest Service, U.S.
Dep't of Agric.); Julia Wondolleck & Steven Yaffee, Building Bridges Across Agency Boundaries:
In Search of Excellence in the U.S. Forest Service, Section IV (1994) (case studies of Yakima
Resource Management Cooperative, Negrito Ecosystem Project, Blue Mountains Natural Resources
Institute).
24. Record of Decision,supra note 22, at D-4 to D-5 (discussing social objectives of Adaptive
Management Areas, and noting that the AMAs "should provide opportunities for land managing and
regulatory agencies, other government entities, nongovernmental organizations, local groups,
landowners, communities, and citizens to work together to develop innovative management
approaches").
25. Shannon & Anderson, supra note 16, at 152-56.
26. See infra part ll.B.
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Formation ofEcosystem Management Groups

Ecosystem management groups that have been studied suggest three
models of formation. The "independent" model is formed outside of the
auspices of federal agencies but with their participation either during or
after formation." Such groups develop their own statements of purpose
and have self-selecting memberships.28
The "collaborative" model is suggested by groups initially proposed
by non-federal parties, but organized with relatively exiensive federal
involvement in the form of initial approval, funding, and administrative
support.29
A third model of formation may arise under the federal Forest Plan for
the Pacific Northwest. Under the Forest Plan, the federal agencies might
choose to create and use citizen advisory groups as par: of the AMA
strategy." In some areas, where the capacity for self-organization does
27. The independent model is based on various characteristics of the Applegate Partnership, as
described in Lynch, supranote 4, at 2-1I; Washington State's Timber, Fish & Wildlife Agreement,
as described in Lynch, supra note 23; and the Yakima Resource Management Cooperative, as
described in Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23. The Applegate Partnership was formed through
the efforts of a local environmentalist and a member of an aerial forestry foundation, who brought
together representatives from environmental groups, industry groups, local government, the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management. Lynch, supra note 4, at 3-4. An initial group wrote a
vision statement and created the Applegate Partnership's Board. Id. The Timber Fish & Wildlife
agreement (TFW) was formed through the joint efforts of environmentalists, industry, Native
American tribes, and the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Lynch, supra note
23, at 2. Finally, the Yakima Resource Management Cooperative in Eastern Washington was formed
by the parties to the TFW agreement and included the Forest Service. Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra
note 23, at 8-I.
28. See, e.g., Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at 8-2; Lynch, supra rote 4, at 3-4. For
instance, the Cooperative Monitoring, Evaluation, and Research Committee, part of the organization
created to administer Washington State's Timber, Fish & Wildlife agreement, must always have
members from environmental groups, industry, Native American tribes, and state agencies. See
Lynch, supra note 23, at 2-3.
29. The "collaborative" model is based on various characteristics of the Negrito Ecosystem
Project in New Mexico (NEP) and to some extent the Blue Mountains Natural Resources Institute
(BMNRI). See Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at 2-I to 2-5, 4-1 to 4-5. The NEP was formed
when members of a local conservation group approached the Forest Service about doing ecosystem
management. The Forest Supervisor approved the idea, and a group including Forest Service staff,
an environmentalist, a timber company representative, a county extension agent, and a grazing
permittee began to meet. The BMNRI was formed when local citizens who were unsatisfied with the
extent to which research at the Forest Service's Pacific Northwest Research Station (PNW)
addressed local concerns proposed a new conduit for public input on research. The BMNRI is a
Forest Service research, development, and application program and is administratively located in
PNW.
30. Under the plan for management of federal forest lands in the Pacific Northwest, the Adaptive
Management Areas are mandated to encourage participation of those who express an interest in the
AMAs. Experimentation with the forms that such participation might take is encouraged. Record of
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not exist, ecosystem management groups might be federally initiated.
Federal agencies might provide meeting space and funding, and play a
prominent role in the initial organization of such groups.
2.

Operationof Ecosystem Management Groups

The operation of ecosystem management groups may be broken down
into two components for the purpose of analysis under FACA. First, the
level of control and management by the federal government is
important.3' Second, the types of activities carried out by the group are
critical.32
Ecosystem management groups evince a range of federal control and
involvement in their management. For the purpose of this paper, two
models will be used. "Independent groups" operate independently of
federal agencies, but have federal agency members.33 These groups run
their own meetings, receive funding from multiple sources, and set their
own agendas.34 While they may propose actions or policies to federal or
other government agencies, their emphasis is the management of the
entire ecosystem. 3 Other groups, labeled "collaborative groups" for
purposes of this Comment, tend to be administratively located within
agencies, receive most of their funding from agencies, and have a focus
on federal policies and activities. 31
A feature that most ecosystem management groups share, regardless
of whether they are similar to the independent or collaborative models
described above, is that federal and non-federal group members share
responsibility for defining the goals and purpose of the group.37 In
decision, supra note 22, at D-5 to D-6. Currently, federal efforts to work collaboratively with others
in the AMAs is being hindered by concerns about FACA violation. See, e.g., Vanderwood &
Antypas, supra note 4, at 8; Lynch, supra note 4, at 16-17.
31. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
33. It is conceivable that groups that are independently formed may be collaboratively operated,
and vice versa. Therefore, it should not be assumed that a group whose formation resembles the
independent model of formation will necessarily be operated in a way that resembles the independent
model of operation.
34. For examples of groups resembling this model, see Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at
8-I to 8-5; Lynch, supranote 4; Lynch, supra note 23.
35. Lynch, supranote 4, at 2,9-10; Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at 8-2 to 8-3.
36. This model is based loosely on characteristics of the Negrito Ecosystem Project and the Blue
Mountains Natural Resources Institute. See Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at 2-1 to 2-5, 4-2
to 4-5. Both of these groups are administered and heavily funded by the Forest Service.
37. See, e.g, Wondolleck & Yaffee, supranote 23, at 2-2, 4-3, 8-2; Lynch, supra note 4, at 4-7.
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addition, both categories of members decide which issues should be
addressed or which projects should be undertaken.3 8
With respect to the activities of ecosystem management groups, two
issues are of concern. First, many groups deal with ecosysi:ems owned by
several entities.39 Second, while some groups do give advice directly,
several carry out a wide range of functions including projects on private
land, public education, research, data gathering, and monitoring.4"
II.

THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT

Congress enacted FACA in 1972 to deal with several concerns about
federal use of advisory committees. Senate hearings revealed that
advisory committees continued to absorb revenue for redundant or
obsolete purposes despite regulation by the executive branch.4' In
addition, the hearings showed that advisory committees, contrary to the
public access requirements of Executive Order 11007,42 often "met in
secret... [and] charged exorbitant fees for their minutes, if they kept any
at all."43 A 1970 House Report set forth twenty recommendations for
management of advisory committees." Many of these were incorporated
into a bill that, with some modification, became law as FACA in 1972."5

38. See, e.g., Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at 2-2,4-3.
39. See, e.g., Lynch, supranote 4, at 2; Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, it 8-1.
40. For example, BMNRI carries out demcnstration projects, offers publications, organizes
meetings and workshops, and carries out applied research. Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at
2-1 to 2-2. The Yakima Resource Management Cooperative has developed a watershed remediation
plan, published a public education pamphlet, and jointly funded research projects. Id. at 8-2 to 8-3.
The Applegate Partnership has sponsored and organized demonstration projects, organized and
obtained funding for watershed restoration projects, and publishes a newsletter. Lynch, supranote 4,
at 9-10.
41. Michelle Nuszkiewicz, Twenty Years of the FederalAdvisory Committee Act: It's Time for
Some Changes, 65 S.Cal. L. Rev. 957,965 (1992).
42. 3 C.F.R. 573 (1959-1963). This Executive Order was a pre-FACA attempt to increase
government control over advisory committees and to limit their membership. Levine, supranote 2, at
220-21.
43. William H. Rodgers, Jr., EnvironmentalLaw § 1.7, at 77 (2d ed. 1994). A pre-FACA advisory
committee that exemplifies some of the problems FACA was intended to solve was the National
Industrial Pollution Control Council. See William, H. Rodgers, Jr., The National IndustrialPollution
ControlCouncil: Advise or Collude?, 13 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 719 (1972).
44. H.R. Rep. No. 1731, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 20-24 (1970), cited in Leviiie, supra note 2, at
222.
45. Levine, supra note 2, at 222-25.

Ecosystem Management and FACA
A.

FACA Provisions

FACA addresses the problems of advisory committees in two ways. It
controls the creation, membership, and jurisdiction of the committees,
and it creates procedural requirements intended to increase openness and
federal control of committee proceedings.4 6
FACA's controls on the federal creation and continued existence of
advisory committees are aimed at reducing redundancy, wastefulness,
and representative imbalance on advisory committees. Federal officials
must determine whether a proposed committee's work could be done by
an already established committee.' Statutory guidelines require federal
proponents to provide a clearly defined purpose for a proposed advisory
committee, require that committee membership be "fairly balanced in
terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed
by the advisory committee,"" and assure that the advice given the
committee will not be "inappropriately influenced" by special interests.49
A new advisory committee may not meet until it files a charter with
either with the Administrator of General Services in the case of
presidential committees, or with the appropriate administrative agency
head and standing congressional committees." A charter must include
the committee's purpose and scope of activity, the period of time
necessary for it to carry out its purpose, the agency or official to whom it
reports, and a description of its duties." If an advisory committee is not
renewed by a federal official and its life span is not determined by
statute, the committee is automatically terminated two years after its
establishment. 2
FACA's procedural requirements provide for public notice and access,
and for increased federal supervision. Committee meetings must be open

46. Rodgers, Environmental Law, supranote 43, at 79-80.
47. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)-(c) (1994). The requirements in § 5(b)
apparently apply only where federal actors are considering the establishment of an advisory
committee. These requirements apply to the standing committees of Congress through § 5(b) and are
extended to other federal officials through § 5(c) "to the extent they are applicable."
48. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2) (1994).
49. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(3) (1994).
50. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(c) (1994). This requirement apparently applies to both federally
created and federally utilized committees. See Food Chem. News, Inc. v. Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048
(D.D.C. 1974) (holding that utilized advisory committee was required to have charter and otherwise
be established by utilizing agency).
51. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(c).
52. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 14(a) (1994).
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to the public53 and advertised in the Federal Register.' Minutes and other

committee documents must be made available to the public for

inspection or copying. 5 Advisory committees may meet only at the call
of, or with the approval of, a designated federal officer,56 and there must
be a designated federal officer present at every meeting." In addition,
meeting agendas must be approved by the designated fede:ral officer. 8
B.

FA CA Case law

Most FACA litigation concerns whether particular groups fit the
definition of an advisory committee." For ecosystem management
groups, this is the crucial issue, because an affirmative answer triggers
the panoply of FACA requirements.
1.

Statutory Definition ofAdvisory Committee

Under FACA, a committee is an advisory committee if it is
"established or utilized" by the President or an executive agency., Most

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §
FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §
FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §
FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §
FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §

10(a)(1) (1994). Exceptions are specified in § 10(d).
10(a)(2) (1994).
10(b) (1994).
10(f) (1994).
10(e) (1994).

58. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(f).
59. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); Food Chem.
News, Inc. v. Young, 900 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,498 U.S. 846 (1990); Washington Legal
Found. v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
60. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (1994). The section provides:
For the purpose of this Act(2) The term "advisory committee" means any committee, board, commission, council,
conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup
thereof (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as "committee"), which is (A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies,
in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies
or officers of the Federal Government ....
It should be noted that all of FACA's requirements may not apply to all utilized committees, at
least under the pre-1989 definition of utilized. See Center for Auto Safety v. Co., 580 F.2d 689, 694
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
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courts have analyzed the terms "established" and "utilized" separately.6
Under this analysis, groups established without government involvement,

but later utilized by the government, may fall within the definition of an
advisory committee. General Services Administration (GSA) regulations
implementing FACA distinguish between establishment and utilization,62
but recent case law has modified this distinction.63
2.

The Definition of "Established"

The GSA regulations set out four ways to establish an advisory
committee: by Congress through statutory mandate; by the President
through an Executive Order; or by an agency under either specific
statutory authorization or general agency authority.6
a.

Establishmentby Statute

Courts have interpreted establishment by statute narrowly.65 An
advisory committee must have been expressly created by statute. 66 A but-

61. Rodgers, Environmental Law, supra note 43, at 83. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F.
Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that committee of National Academy of Sciences was not
advisory committee because it was neither established nor utilized by an agency), aff'd, 546 F.2d
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,431 U.S. 932 (1977).
62. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1994) (defining "utilized" to include "a committee or other group
composed in whole or in part of other than full-time officers or employees of the Federal
Government with an established existence outside the agency seeking its advice"). Establishment of
an advisory committee is addressed by4l C.F.R. § 101-6.1005 discussing authorities for establishing
an advisory committee, and 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1007, detailing complicated procedures which a
creating governmental authority must comply with to establish an advisory committee.
63. See infra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
64. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1005 (1994). Because no ecosystem management groups have been formed
by executive order, this method of formation is not discussed in this Comment. In addition, there is
currently no statute dealing expressly with ecosystem management. However, there has been interest
expressed in Congress in enacting legislation regarding ecosystem management. See, e.g., S. 2385,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 93, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Therefore, establishment by
statute is discussed in light of the possibility that such a statute may be passed in the near future.
Establishment by an agency is relevant to current ecosystem management groups.
65. See Rodgers, Environmental Law, supra note 43, at 83.
66. Public Citizen Health Res. Group v. National Capital Med. Found., Civ. No. 82-0009, 1983
WL 29917 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 1983) (holding that Professional Standards Review Act, which required
Secretary of Health and Human Services to enter into agreement with organization to be designated
as Professional Standards Review Organization for particular geographic area, presupposed
existence of qualified organizations and therefore did not "establish" such organizations); Lombardo
v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 796 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that committee was not established by
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (1970), which directed EPA to enter into
arrangements with National Academy of Sciences to undertake a study, but never directly mentioned
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for causation relationship between the statute and the fbrmation of a
committee is insufficient to find establishment. 67 One court has stated
that where a statute gives an agency the option of convening panels or
contracting with appropriate groups to produce guidelines, panels so
created are established by the agency and not by the statute.65
b.

Establishmentby an Agency

Case law regarding agency establishment deals with two scenarios. In
some cases, the group in question directly advises an agency. In other
groups are separated from the agency by intermediary
cases, advisory
69
groups.

Courts find establishment by an agency to be a fairly straightforward
issue when a group directly advises an agency. In one such case, the
Secretary of the Interior directed the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
organize a scientific advisory panel to assess the status of a potentially
endangered species.70 In another case, a court found that a group was not
established by an agency where the agency did not fund the group, set its
agenda, or appoint its members. 7
Cases involving intermediary groups and subgroups present more
complicated analysis. In Lombardo v. Handler,72 the court noted that
Congress had expressed an intent to restrict FACA to committees
"directly" established by the federal government. The court relied on
documentation apparently indicating that the proposal to create the
committee in question had originated in the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), and that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the relevant agency, was not particularly concerned wiih the internal

formation of advisory committee), afjd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932

(1977).
67. Lombardo, 397 F. Supp. at 796.
68. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Clinton, :370 F. Supp. 379 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd sub nom.
Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus, 61 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
69. See Rodgers, EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 43, at 84-85, for a discussion of "the subgroup
problem."
70. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Department of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1104-05 (11th
Cir. 1994).
71. Center for Auto Safety v. Federal Highway Admin., Civ. No. 89-1045, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13733, at *6-7 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1990).
72. Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 797 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied,431 U.S. 932 (1977).
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organization of the contractor performing the study for the NAS. It found
that the committee was not established by the EPA.73
Similarly, in Food Chemical News, Inc. v. Young,74 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) established an advisory panel under a research
contract requiring its formation. The court was influenced by the fact that
the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology
(FASEB), the organization that contracted with the FDA, proposed the
panel and selected its members. FASEB also set the panel's agenda,
scheduled its meetings, and was responsible for reviewing its work.75
3.

The Definition of "Utilize"

The definition of "utilize" has been perhaps the most perplexing
aspect of FACA litigation. A 1989 U.S. Supreme Court case has
substantially affected the analysis of this issue and has added to the
confusion regarding the application of FACA.76
Under the GSA regulations, a committee is "utilized" when it is:
a committee or other group . . . with an established existence
outside the agency seeking its advice which the . . . agency
official(s) adopts, such as through institutional arrangements, as a
preferred source from which to obtain advice or recommendations
... in the same manner as that individual would obtain advice or
recommendations from an established advisory committee.77
Case law prior to 1989 is in accord with this common sense definition,
focusing on the group's role in the creation of federal policy. Courts held
that groups not established by the federal government were utilized by
agencies that solicited their views on proposed regulations or
amendments to regulations.78 In one case, the District Court of the
73. Id.
74. 900 F.2d 328, 332 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,498 U.S. 846 (1990).
75. Id. at 333.
76. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), discussed infra notes
81-88 and accompanying text; Mary K. Palladino, Ensuring Coverage, Balance, Openness and
Ethical Conductfor Advisory Committee Members Under the FederalAdvisory Committee Act, 5
Admin. UJ. 231, 253 (1991).
77. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1994).
78. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that review
of proposed federal regulations by American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO), an organization of state and federal highway officials, violated FACA); Food
Chem. News, Inc. v. Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding that Bureau of Alcohol,
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District of Columbia held that a committee is utilized when an agency
head discloses proposed regulations to obtain its advice and
recommendations.79 In another case, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals rejected an argument that an independent, pre-existing group,
which reviewed and commented on drafts of proposed federal highway
regulations, was not an advisory committee, stating instead that
regardless of whether an agency creates an advisory committee or makes
use of a pre-existing group, the corrmmittee must comply with FACA.8"
In Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,8 the U.S. Supreme Court
set forth a narrow interpretation of "utilized."82 The Court stated that
Congress used the term only to insure a broad interpretation of
"established,"" covering groups formed for government agencies by
"quasi-public" entities such as the National Academy of S ziences as well
as groups formed by agencies themselves.' In addition, the Court
suggested that groups closely tied to the federal government or amenable
to strict agency management are among the groups Congress intended
FACA to cover."
The Court narrowly interpreted "utilize" in part because the
application of FACA to the facts of the case was a potential infringement
on executive powers.86 The group in question---the American Bar
Association's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary--advised the
President through the Department of Justice on potential nominees for
federal judgeships. 7 To avoid the constitutional question, the Court
adopted an interpretation of "utilize" that did not cover the ABA
committee."
Since Public Citizen, a few courts have interpreted the meaning of
"established or utilized" where groups were not clearly established by the
Tobacco, and Firearms utilized groups of industry representatives with whom it met to obtain
"preliminary views" respecting proposed amerdments to regulations dealing with labeling and
advertising of certain alcoholic beverages).
79. Davis, 378 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
80.
81.
82.
50.
83.
84.
85.

Cox, 580 F.2d at 693-94.
491 U.S. 440 (1989).
Rodgers, EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 43, at 83. See also Palladino, su7ra note 76, at 239491 U.S. at 462.
Id.
Id.at 457.

86. Id. at 465--66.
87. Id. at 443-45.
88. Id. at 465-67.
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federal government. These cases have established two points. First,
utilization of a pre-established group by a federal agency is likely to be
analyzed in terms of control and management by the agency. Second, the
participation of federal employees in a group is insufficient by itself to
render the group an advisory committee.
In Food ChemicalNews, Inc. v. Young, 89 an expert panel assembled by
the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB)
under a contract with the FDA was alleged to be an advisory
committee. 90
The court of appeals reversed the district court's holding
that the expert panel was an advisory committee, noting that Public
Citizen was decided while Young was on appeal. 9' Focusing on the
language of Public Citizen that groups "closely tied to the Federal
Government" are covered by FACA, the court held that the FDA did not
utilize the panel because FASEB managed it, and it was therefore not
amenable to any management by the FDA or any semiprivate entity the
Federal Government helped create. 92
In Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Sentencing
Commission,93 the court also focused on the group's ties to the federal
government. In holding that the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Advisory
Working Group on Environmental Sanctions was not utilized by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the court stated that utilization requires
actual management or control of a committee by an agency.9 4 The court
acknowledged the influence exerted by DOJ on the group through its
representatives in the group and on the Sentencing Commission, but
concluded that such influence was not equivalent to control.95 The fact

89. 900 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,498 U.S. 846 (1990).
90. It was determined initially that FASEB was not an advisory committee because it fell within
the exclusion for government contractors. Id. at 331.

9 1. Id. at 329.
92. Id. at 332-33 (citing Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 457,462).
93. Washington Legal Found. v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
94. Id. at 1450. Between Food Chem. News, Inc. v. Young and Washington Legal Foundation,
there may be a conflict regarding whether actual control is required or potential control is sufficient.
The Young court stated that a committee may be an advisory committee where it is "amenable" to
agency control, 900 F.2d at 333, while the Washington Legal Foundation court found that
"something along the lines of actual management or control" is necessary, 17 F.3d at 1450. Because
the Washington Legal Foundation court cited Young as authority on this point, it apparently did not
mean to hold differently. However, the language in these cases could lead to two possible
interpretations.
95. Washington Legal Foundation, 17 F.3d at 1451. See also Center for Auto Safety v. Federal
Highway Admin., Civ. No. 89-1045, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1990).
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that the Commission, rather than DOJ, managed the group and was the
intended recipient of its recommendations indicated that the group was
not controlled by DOJ.96
While an argument might be made that the analysis in Washington
Legal Foundation and Food ChemicalNews should be confined to cases
involving intermediary groups, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has suggested that this reasoning applies even in cases where
there is a direct relationship between the relevant agency and the group
in question. 97
The District of Columbia courts have held in two cases that agency
employee participation in a group is insufficient by itself to make that
group an advisory committee. In Washington Legal Found2tion, as stated
above, the court distinguished between the influence that such members
might exert on the group and the level of control required for
utilization.98 In Center for Auto Safety v. Federal Highway
Administration,99 which did not involve an intermediary group, the
plaintiffs urged the court to distinguish Public Citizen because that case
did not involve federal participation on the committee, whereas in the
plaintiffs case, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) officials did
participate. The court declined to do so, stating that possible abuses
resulting from intergroup membership alone did not justify an exemption
from Public Citizen. 00
4.

Advice on a PolicyIssue

The GSA regulations state that an advisory committee subject to
FACA is one established or utilized by a federal entity "for the purpose
of obtaining advice or recommendations on issues or policies which are
within the scope of [its] responsibilities."' 0 ' Some cases have exempted
groups from FACA because they were not advising the federal
government. For instance, an industry committee that met with federal
96. Washington Legal Foundation, 17 F.3d at 1451.
97. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus, 61 F.3d 929, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Young, 900
F.2d 328; Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,461-62 (1989); Washington
Legal Foundation,17 F.3d at 1450, in the context of a group that was created and arguably managed
by the Research Agency of the Department of He&lth and Human Services.)
98. Washington Legal Foundation,17 F.3d at 1450-51.
99. Civ. No. 89-1045, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1990).
100. Id. at *6-7. The court also noted that any AASHTO recommendations to the FHWA must go
through administrative rulemaking procedures, preventing a "rubber-stamp" by the agency. Id. at *7.
101. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1994).
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officials to obtain input on a proposal considered by the committee was
exempt. 2 Similarly, a panel was exempted because its advice was
directed to physicians, educators, and the public rather than to a federal
agency." 3 One court also considered the possibility of applying FACA to
some, but not all contacts between a group that was deemed to be utilized
by an agency when its advice was specifically solicited on proposed
regulations.' °
The function of a group may be "operational," rather than advising.0 5
In Natural Resources .Defense Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency," 6 the court held that the Governors' Forum on Environmental
Management, advising the EPA on the ability of states to carry out their
responsibilities under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), was not
covered by FACA. The court characterized the forum as a partnership
acting in an operational capacity rather than as a group of advisors. 07 In
part, this view was based on the need for action at both the state and
federal levels to implement the SDWA 8 The court also noted that the
forum received no federal funds, had no fixed membership, and had no
specific plans for future proceedings, and that federalism and separation
of powers concerns would arise if FACA were applied to groups of
elected state officials.0 9 An important qualifier with respect to the
characterization of groups as operational is that their functions must be
"specifically provided by law, such as making or implementing
Government decisions or policy.""'
102. Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, 409 F.
Supp. 473, 477 (D.D.C. 1976), affrd without op., 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
103. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Clinton, 870 F. Supp. 379, 383 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that
panel of experts and consumers convened by Agency for Health Care Policy and Research to
develop clinical practice guideline on treatment of lower back pain for health care practitioners was
not an advisory committee), affd sub nom. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus, 61 F.3d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
104. Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
105. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004 (1994) exempts committees "established to perform primarily
operational as opposed to advisory functions. Operational functions are those specifically provided
by law, such as making or implementing Government decisions or policy."
106. 806 F. Supp. 275 (D.D.C. 1992). See also Public Citizen v. Commission on the Bicentennial,
622 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that committee whose statutory duties included planning
and developing bicentennial activities, encouraging state, local and private involvement, and
coordinating activities throughout the states was primarily an operational committee)
107. 806 F. Supp. at 277-79.

108. Id. at 277-78.
109. Id. at 278. In 1995, Congress exempted meetings between federal and state, local, and tribal
government officials from FACA. See supranote 1.
110. 41 C.F.R § 101-6.1004 (1994).
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III. APPLICATION OF FACA CASE LAW TO ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT GROUPS
The holding in NorthwestForestResources Council v. Espy'. that the
President's Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT)
was an advisory committee subject to and in violation of FACA brought
the statute to the attention of the federal land management agencies." 2
Despite the fact that FEMAT fit much more clearly into the definition of
an advisory committee than any ecosystem management group, and that
challengers of FEMAT were denied injunctive relief, Espy sent
shockwaves through the agencies' collaborative efforts.' 's
A.

Problemswith Applying FACA to Ecosystem Management Groups

Compliance with FACA poses problems for ecosystem management
groups for several reasons." 4 Therefore, the uncertainty that currently
surrounds FACA's definition of an advisory committee is a stumbling
block for federal ecosystem management efforts.
The dominant role of federal officials in FACA committees poses
problems for groups whose goal is to manage entire ecosystems with
combinations of public and private landowners."' FACA's requirements
for federal approval of charters"6 and for a designated federal officer
who must be present at all meetings, approve meeting agendas, and who
may adjourn meetings at her discretion, give extensive control to the
federal agency or agencies involved. Such control is problematic where
the scope of issues dealt with by the group is broader than ,.ederal policy,

111. 846 F. Supp. 1009 (D.D.C. 1994).
112. FEMAT was created following the 1993 "forest conference" held by President Clinton to
address the controversy between environmentalists and the forest products industry regarding the
management of federal forests. FEMAT produced a report discussing managemont alternatives that
is the basis of the current Forest Plan. The Northwest Forest Resources Council, a non-profit
organization representing the forest products industry, alleged that FEMAT was an advisory
committee and therefore its meetings should have been open to the public. Id.
113. See Durbin, supra note 3.
114. Meidinger, supra note 16, at 18-20; Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 2.3, at app. D-7 to D8; GAO Report, supra note 4, at 59, 73.
115. See Meidinger, supranote 16, at 19-20.
116. The paperwork for the Blue Mountain Natural Resources Institute, for example, was delayed
in the approval process. Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at app. D-9; Me dinger, supra note
16, at 19.
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and where those whose cooperation is essential to the management of the
entire ecosystem might resent federal control. 17
In addition, the typical advisory committee contemplated by FACA is
created to provide advice on a particular policy. Ecosystem management
groups, however, tend to be long-running, have broadly stated missions
encompassing a variety of policy issues, and have shifting memberships.
Rigid charters that may only be amended through cumbersome
procedures may be problematic for such groups. 8
B.

Models of Ecosystem Management Groups and the Definition of an
Advisory Committee

The following section applies FACA case law to the three models of
ecosystem management groups suggested earlier. 9 in order to pinpoint
the areas of uncertainty and to suggest possible outcomes. To summarize,
ecosystem management groups that fall within the definition of
"establishment" by the federal government are far more likely to be
considered advisory committees under current case law. Groups that do
not fit within this definition are probably not covered by FACA, unless
they fit within the narrow definition of "utilize" set forth in the recent
line of cases described below. In addition, the functions of ecosystem
management groups often involve more than advising, if they involve
advising at all. This raises the question of how groups with multiple
functions should be treated under FACA, a question that has not been
effectively resolved by the courts.
1.

Establishmentby Statute

No federal statute specifically addresses ecosystem management.
While some commentators have noted that public land and
environmental statutes give the federal land management agencies
authority to implement ecosystem management at their discretion, 20 a
tenuous link between activity mandated by statute and the formation of
an advisory group is insufficient by itself to create an "established"

117.

Meidinger, supranote 16, at 18-19.
118. Id. at 18-20, Wondolleck & Yaffee, supra note 23, at app. D7.
119. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 13, at 303-04.
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no existing ecosystem
apparentbythat
is thus
committee."
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established
groups haveIt been
management
2.

Establishmentby an Agency

In the absence of statutory establishment, the question becomes
whether a group has been established by an agency. Factors the courts
consider include whether an agency originated the proposal to create the
committee, concerned itself with the organization of the activity being
undertaken, selected the group members, funds the group, or sets the
group's agenda. Evidence that these functions were assumed by a nongovernmental entity has led courts to find that groups were not
established by an agency.'
Independent ecosystem management groups formed with little agency
involvement are unlikely to come under the category of agency
established committees. Typically, proposals for establishing such
groups come from outside government agencies. While agency
representatives may play a part in the creation of these groups, their role
is equal to that of non-agency actors.' The groups set their own agendas
and determine membership according to agreements or bylaws set by the
124
groups themselves or by another group independent of ;government.
They may receive some funding from government agencies, 25 but this
appears to be the only factor that might support a finding of agency
establishment.
Collaborative groups, which are typically proposed by individuals
outside of a federal agency but which tend to be funded by the agency
and administratively located within the agency, are more likely to fall
within the "established by an agency" category. However, they are
distinguishable in some ways from groups that have been determined by
the courts to be established by an agency. On one hand, the central role
of federal actors in their creation could influence a court to decide that
they are advisory committees. In contrast to independent groups, they are
upon approval of federal employees and focus on
typically formed
26
federal issues.
121. See supranotes 65-68 and accompanying:text.
122. See supranotes 72-75 and accompanying text.
123. See supranotes 27-28 and accompanying text..
124. See supranote 28 and accompanying text
125. See Lynch, supra note 4, at 10.
126. See supranote 29 and accompanying text
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On the other hand, the fact that collaborative groups are proposed by
non-federal parties could contribute to a finding against agency
establishment.' 27 In addition, in the groups upon which this model is
based, the relevant agency did not choose the members of the group;
rather, membership was self-selecting.' 28 Finally, federal and non-federal
actors share the responsibility for setting the goals and purposes of these
groups.'29 These factors would support a finding that such groups are not
established by an agency.
The lack of an intermediate establishing group 3 ' may distinguish the
collaborative ecosystem management groups from the groups in
Lombardo v. Handler' and Food Chemical News, Inc. v. Young.'32 A
court might be more willing to find FACA establishment where the
relevant agency and the group being created, rather than a non-federal
intermediary group alone, assumed establishment responsibilities.
AMA groups formed by the Forest Service or BLM under the federal
Forest Plan probably would be considered established by an agency. 33 If
agency officials decided to convene a group, chose its members or a
method for selecting them, directed it to focus on particular issues or
questions, funded it, and provided a meeting place, courts probably
would find it to be an advisory committee.
3.

Utilization by an Agency

The definition of "utilize" may be approached in one of two ways in
the ecosystem management context, where separation of powers
concerns are unlikely to arise. One approach follows the example of the
District of Columbia courts in Young,'34 Washington Legal Foundationv.
United States Sentencing Commission,'s and Centerfor Auto Safety v.
FederalHighway Administration,136 applying Public Citizen to situations

127. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
128. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
129. See supranotes 37-38 and accompanying text.
130. See supranotes 72-75 and accompanying text.
131. 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 932 (1977).
132. 900 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990).
133. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
134. 900 F.2d328.
135. 17 F.3d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
136. Civ. No. 89-1045, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1990).
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where no serious constitutional concerns exist.'37 This approach would
very likely continue to be followed in the District of Columbia courts
and in other circuits, given the fact that the majority of FACA cases have
been decided by the District of Columbia courts.
A second approach would confine Public Citizen's narrow
interpretation of "utilize" to situations involving potential constitutional
violations. However, in light of a footnote in a recent District of
Columbia Court of Appeals decision that expressly rejected this
argument, it is unlikely that courts in other circuits will accept it. 3'
Therefore, the following discussion focuses on the approach taken by
Public Citizen and its progeny.
Under Public Citizen, as interpreted in Young and Washington Legal
Foundation,a group might be utilized by the federal government if it is
controlled or managed by a federal agency or quasi-public entity. 39 The
court of appeals cases found that the extent of management and control
by intermediary groups and the lack of federal involvement indicated the
absence of the close ties to the government necessary to constitute
utilization."'
The definition of "utilize" set forth in the court of appeals cases
probably insulates the independent ecosystem management groups.
Independent groups assume the same management functions as did the
intermediary groups in Washington Legal Foundation and Young and are
therefore unlikely to be found to be managed or controlled by
agencies.' 4 ' Furthermore, even though the independent groups include
agency representatives as participants,'4 2 the cases have held that this

137. Young and Washington Legal Foundation did not involve presidential advisory committees;
thus the constitutional concerns about interference with the powers of the President which were
raised in Public Citizen were not present.
138. In Sofamor Danek v. Gaus, 61 F.3d 929, 936 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the court stated in a
footnote that it found unpersuasive the contention of amicus curiae that Public Citizen's narrow
definition of utilize should be confined to circumstances raising a constitutional issue, citing Young's
application of Public Citizen despite the absence of a constitutional issue.
139. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text. Note that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has suggested that the Young and Washington Legal Foundationanalysi; may be applied to
non-federally established groups which interact directly with the federal govemment rather than
through an intermediary group. Sofamor, 61 F.3d at 936.
141. See supranotes 31-34 and accompanying text.
142. See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
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alone does not constitute control or by itself bring a group within the
purview of FACA.
In addition, independent groups are clearly not controlled by agencies.
Federal agencies involved in independent ecosystem management groups
may provide some funding and meeting space, however these functions
are shared among group members. Agency participants are involved in
setting agendas, defining purpose, and making decisions to the same
extent as all other participants. Therefore, agency employees act as
members, rather than managers, of these groups.
Assuming that collaborative groups are not established by an agency,
it is more difficult to predict whether they would be utilized by agencies
under the analysis in Young and Washington Legal Foundation. In the
collaborative groups, federal agencies assume more of a management
function, such as providing all or most of the group's funding,
administrative support, and meeting space. 144
However, even these groups are not under federal control to the extent
that FASEB controlled the advisory group in Young. a4 Responsibility for
determining the goals of the group, making funding decisions for specific
projects, and setting priorities, for example, is shared between federal
and non-federal participants. 46 Because the courts have not set forth any
sort of balancing test or given any other indication of the extent of
control and management necessary to bring groups within the purview of
FACA, it is difficult to predict the result of applying Young and
Washington Legal Foundationto collaborative groups.
4.

Advice on a Policy Issue

Most ecosystem management groups, particularly the independent
groups, engage in some activities that have nothing to do with federal
land management or which could not be described as advising. 47 Public
education efforts or projects conducted on private land may involve input
from federal agencies but do not constitute advice to an agency on its

143. E.g., Washington Legal Found. v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1451
(D.C. Cir. 1994).

144. See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
145. See supranotes 89-92 and accompanying text.
146. See supranotes 37-38 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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policies or activities. 48 Such efforts involve advising the public, not
federal agencies. In addition, joint efforts to gather data, create a
Geographic Information System map of an ecosystem, and monitor the
results of projects may be characterized as "operational," to the extent
that they are undertaken to implement federal policy.
In Centerfor Auto Safety v. Cox,14 9 the court held that where federal
employees were involved in a range of a group's activities, only some of
which constituted utilization by the federal government for the
procurement of advice, FACA should be applied only to the latter
category of activities. 5 This suggests that either the court or the relevant
agency could fashion guidelines specifying which of a greup's activities
triggered FACA's requirements.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Collaborative, multi-interest groups, despite some flaws, represent a
promising means for effecting the goals of ecosystem management. They
provide an avenue for information exchange, coordinated management,
and social and scientific learning that regulation and other institutions do
not. In addition, voluntary participation and self-regulation may be more
effective at promoting sustainable use of resources than additional
federal regulation, if they can be achieved in a way that ensures
ecosystem 5integrity in conjunction with the sustainable economic use of
resources.1 1
The federal government, as a major landowner and regulator, has a
critical role to play in participating in and guiding ecosystem
management efforts. Therefore, it should strive to provide clear,
scientifically sound policy guidelines to federal agencies participating in
ecosystem management groups and to eliminate obstacles, such as the
legal uncertainty created by FACA. One way to minimize the chilling
effect that FACA is having on ecosystem management efforts would be
148. The Applegate Partnership, for example, has conducted a number of projects on private land.
See Lynch, supranote 4, at 9.
149. 580 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to narrowly tailor its order regarding which of the group's meetings were covered by
FACA, and which provisions of FACA should be applied. The latter issue is unlikely to arise under
current case law, in which groups not subject to any control or management by the federal
government are not considered to be advisory committees.

150. Id. at 694-95.
151. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrum, Governing iMe Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action (1990) (discussing successful commons, all which involve self-regulation by users
of resources in the commons).
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to clarify the factors that contribute to a finding that an advisory
committee exists.
Some of the requirements of FACA, such as public accessibility and
viewpoint balance,'52 are likely to further the effectiveness of ecosystem
management efforts and should therefore be encouraged by federal
policies regarding ecosystem management groups. Other aspects of
FACA, such as the level of federal control which it imposes on advisory
committees, should be minimized in the ecosystem management context.
A.

The Definition of an Advisory Committee Should Be Clarified

This Comment has attempted to explain how the definition of an
advisory committee might be applied to ecosystem management groups.
However, the case law leaves troublesome issues unresolved. A partial
solution to the bind in which FACA has put agency ecosystem
management efforts would be the clarification of when FACA applies.
Such clarification should be made with the original purposes of the
statute in mind: the reduction of wasteful consumption of federal
resources by advisory committees, improvement of public access to the
federal decision-making process, and the assurance of viewpoint balance
in advisory committees.'53
Congress or the GSA should clarify the meaning of the term
"established." While establishment by an agency is obvious in some
cases, the determinative factors are less clear where, as in most
ecosystem management groups, federal and non-federal participants
share responsibility for the creation of the group. Guidelines indicating
which factors are critical and how they should be weighed would be
helpful. Given that one purpose of FACA is to reduce waste by federal
advisory committees, the definition of "established" should focus on
whether the group in question is created using primarily federal resources
and is set up as a federal program.
152. While FACA requires that advisory committees have "fairly balanced" membership, FACA,
5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2) (1994), courts have generally deferred to agencies on this issue, many finding
the issue nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that
alleged violation of FACA's fair balance requirement was nonjusticiable); Public Citizen v.
Department of Health & Human Services, 795 F. Supp. 1212 (D.D.C. 1992) (reviewing prior case
law and concluding that fair balance provision is non-justiciable). An alternative approach is
suggested by National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm., 557 F. Supp. 524, 528 (D.D.C.),
aff'd, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983), in which a district court grappled with the issue of balanced
membership, and noting that the statute does not explain the term, concluded that balance should be
assessed in terms of the function to be performed by the committee in question.
153. See supra part II.A.
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The definition of "utilize" should be clarified as well. Prior to Public
Citizen, this term brought within FACA's scope groups that advised
t4
1
federal agencies on policy issues on a regular or formalized basis.
Public Citizen shifted the focus away from the function of groups in the
federal policymaking process and toward the extent of the
institutionalization of the group within that process. It is not clear that
this is a useful analysis, assuming that FACA is aimed in part at
improving public access and viewpoint balance in groups that advise the
government. While federal management and control may be indicators
that an agency has formally adopted a particular group as a preferred
source of advice, it may not be determinative in all cases. A more useful
analysis would focus on the question of whether the group provided
advice to the Government on specific policies on a regular and
formalized basis. In addition, guidance should be provided regarding
which sections of FACA apply to utilized advisory committees. It is
possible that the more problematic requirements of FACA might not be
applied to utilized ecosystem management groups.
A major issue in the context of ecosystem manageraent groups is
whether FACA should be applied to their activities that do not constitute
advice-giving. The GSA should address the issue of how FACA applies
to these groups. Any efforts to parse ecosystem management efforts into
advisory and other activities is certain to be difficult, therefore guidelines
addressing this problem are unlikely to completely resolve the issue. One
potentially workable solution would be based on the approach taken in
Centerfor Auto Safety v. Cox: to require compliance with FACA at
group meetings where federal policy is discussed, while exempting other
efforts, such as data-gathering sessions and monitoring.
B.

CertainEcosystem Management Groups Should Be Exemptedfrom
FACA and Guidelines Issued to Govern FederalInvolvement

A clarification of when and how FACA applies would reduce the
uncertainty currently troubling federal ecosystem management efforts.
However, it would not resolve the more fundamental problems with
applying FACA to ecosystem management groups that have the goal of
co-managing lands within a large ecosystem, engag, in multiple
activities, and are characterized by voluntary participation. In addition,
independent groups likely fall outside of FACA's reach and therefore
federal participation in these groups may be unregulated with respect to
154. See supranotes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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public access and viewpoint balance. Therefore, a more complete
solution to the problems raised by FACA would involve exempting
certain ecosystem management groups from FACA and providing
guidelines on the goals of federal participation in such groups and on
public access.
1.

Groups That Should Be Exemptedfrom FACA

Two categories of ecosystem management groups should be expressly
exempted from FACA. First, groups whose goals include comanagement of large ecosystems including private as well as public
lands should be exempted. Under the case law, it is unlikely that FACA
applies to these groups; however, an express exemption would clarify the
situation. A second category of groups that might benefit from an
exemption is those groups that have federal members who participate in
activities in other than discussions of federal policy.
2.

Guidelinesfor GroupsExemptedfrom FACA

Guidance for agencies using ecosystem management groups, in the
form of an ecosystem management statute or agency regulations, should
consist of two elements. The first element should be a statement of the
goals of federal ecosystem management, and a requirement that groups in
which agencies are considering active participation have consistent
goals. The second element should be a provision mandating public
access to the proceedings of ecosystem management groups with federal
participants.
The General Accounting Office's 1994 report on ecosystem
management recognized a need for a clear statement of the policy goals
of ecosystem management by the Administration, particularly with
respect to the priority to be given to ecosystem health where it conflicts
with human activities.'55 Such a statement should be provided and
incorporated into guidelines governing federal participation in ecosystem
management groups. In addition, guidelines should include
recommendations regarding the viewpoints that should be represented in
56
effective ecosystem management groups.
155. GAO report, supra note 4, at 63.
156. The question of adequate representation in the context of ecosystem management is debated.
See, e.g., Shannon & Anderson, supra note 16, at 153-54. The current ecosystem management
groups offer one possibility: most involve environmentalists, industry representatives, Native
American tribes, and private landowners in the area. In addition, ecosystem management efforts
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Agency officials should be required to submit descriptions of groups
they are considering participation in to an interagency individual or panel
capable of assessing the likelihood that federal participalion in a group
will further the goals of ecosystem management set forth above. This
requirement would prevent federal-employee time slated for ecosystem
management from being spent in activities that do not further federal
policy goals. In addition, it would insure viewpoint balance relating to
the goals of ecosystem management.
Legislation or agency regulations or guidelines regulating ecosystem
management groups exempted from FACA should also include
provisions governing public access. By insuring that ecosystem
management groups they participate in are open and give effective notice
to interested parties, federal agencies would increase the likelihood that
those with the range of viewpoints considered important for effective
ecosystem management would participate.
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act 57 offers
an example of how public access might be incorporated into a provision
exempting certain groups from FACA.' 58 Public access provisions should
require that groups publish notice in at least local and regional
newspapers as well as the Federal Register, be open to participation by
other interested parties, and make meeting minutes and other documents
available to the public upon request.1 59
The steps proposed here would accomplish two things. First, they
would eliminate the uncertainty regarding the application of FACA
which currently pervades federal ecosystem management efforts. Second,
they would provide guidance for agencies considering involvement in
independent ecosystem management groups, and would insure that such
involvement would further the goals of ecosystem management. While
the implementation of these steps would not solve all of the problems
associated with the application of FACA to ecosystem management, they
would contribute toward resolving some troublesome issues.

should include scientists in their decision-making efforts, and should avoid relegating them to status
as mere technical advisors. Where possible, academic or independent scientits would lend such
efforts the most credibility.
157. 16 U.S.C. § 1801-81 (1994).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1852() (1994) (exempting regional fishery management c:uncils from FACA
and requiring public notice and access to proceedings).
159. Some groups, such as the Applegate Partnership, have effective out-each through local
channels and regular public participation. See Lynch, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Current FACA case law has created a great deal of uncertainty as to
whether the statute applies to ecosystem management groups. It is
unlikely that FACA applies to groups bearing the characteristics of the
independent ecosystem group model; however, the statute may apply to
other groups. To insure that ecosystem management as contemplated by
the federal agencies is given an opportunity to succeed and is challenged
only on the basis of flaws which would render it ineffective or
environmentally unsound, the federal government should take steps to
clarify the applicability of FACA and to provide more useful guidelines
for federal use of ecosystem management groups.

